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SUMMARY 
Agricultural  trade  policies  are  basically  a  function  of  domestic  policy 
considerations which have produced high levels of  support in many countries. New policy 
instruments such as direct payments, which are more demanding in terms of  information 
costs  but  which  distort  the  resource  allocation  less,  are  becoming  more  attractive. 
Unilateralliberalisation is, however,  unlikely. Freer trade is a public good which requires 
international  collective  action  to be  provided.  Countries which  have  a  clear-cut  trade 
interest in liberalising markets for commodities they export can play the role of  catalyst in 
international co-ordination. The existence of  big players is a favourable factor. Hence, the 
drift of the Round towards a coordination of US-EC interests.  Both political economy 
and trade interest considerations suggest that an agreement reached will have its main 
impact on crops which are widely traded  The main constraining factor of  an agreement 
on EC and US agriculture will be  the  discipline  it will impose  on the  use of export 
subsidies.  Agriculture will still not come fully under the GA 1T  rules which apply to other 
sectors,  but the CAP is likely,  in the future,  to  be more  constrained  by international 
commitments than in the past. -5-
l.  INTRODUCTION 
The pattern of agricultural policies emerging across the world  at  the end of this 
century exhibits distinctive features. Nearly all of  the industrial countries hold resources in 
agriculture behind a panoply of  protectionist barriers that insulate the primary sector from 
international competition.  Meanwhile,  developing countries tend to support their urban-
industrial  sector  at  the  expense  of their  primary  industries.  As  a consequence,  world 
markets for agricultural temperate-zone products are heavily distorted.  Exports from the 
third world face  competition from  rich countries which restrict access to their domestic 
markets and/or dump their surpluses on the world market. Many of  the new industrialised 
countries  tend  to  imitate  this  pattern  and  raise  barriers  to  agricultural  trade  as  the 
development of  their industrial sectors gains momentum. 
In the  industrial  countries,  agricultural  policies  based  on  heavy  government 
interference with market mechanisms are now viewed as a serious problem. Huge budget 
costs, surpluses, environmental degradation and the unsatisfactory levels and distribution 
of farm incomes have strengthened opposition to these policies.  At the same time,  trade 
conflicts have multiplied as evidenced by the increasing number of complaints processed 
by the GATT panels, and by the export subsidy war on grain trade between the European 
Community (EC) and the United States (US). 
In 1982, ministers of  the OECD countries issued a declaration on agricultural trade 
aimed at a major effort of  reassessment and progressive reforms of  agricultural policies. In 
1986, the Uruguay Round was launched by the declaration of Punta del Este.  Although 
this  declaration expressed  a consensus  on  the  need  for  policy  reforms,  the  contracting 
parti~s of  the GATT quickly showed large divergences in their views on the Round, and in 
their willingness to make concessions. Negotiations have already been underway in excess 
of the four years initially foreseen.  This is also the first time that agricultural issues have 
played such an important role,  with several crises triggered when the United  States, the 
Cairns Group and the developing countries insisted on conditioning any general agreement 
on resolutions of  agricultural disputes. 
The  general  purpose  of this  paper  is  to  identify  and  assess  the  main  factors 
determining the likely outcome of the agricultural component of the GATT negotiations. 
These factors  are of political and  economic nature.  First,  the political  market,  biased in 
favour of supported farmers  in nearly all industrial countries,  tends to block the reform 
process implied by a GATT agreement.  Second, the economic costs generated by current -6-
price policies have made new instruments like direct payments more attractive with regard 
to both efficiency and distributive goals. The latter factor, favourable to domestic reforms, 
is enhanced by international pressure due to the existence of potential trade gains from 
liberalisation in some large countries for some commodities.  These expected gains  are 
sufficient to circumvent the free-rider problem built in to the international trade game  .. 
Hence, the role of  the US as a catalyst in the negotiation process and a drift of  the Round 
toward an US-EC conflict.  However, in most countries, the distribution of the benefits 
from liberalisation greatly varies across commodities so that all  countries, including the 
promoters of  freer trade, still want to protect some of  their agricultural sub-sectors. As a 
consequence,  all  contracting parties have an ambiguous position with respect to broad 
principles. A far-reaching agreement is thus unlikely, but agriculture will in the future be 
more under the discipline of  the GATT, particularly in the area of  export subsidies for the 
largely traded commodities. 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 reviews how arguments of political 
economy  and  public  finance  can  be  used  to  explain  government  attitudes  towards 
agricultural policies, and then applies the collective action approach to the GATT game. 
In this light,  Section 3 reviews the negotiation positions and potential  coalitions of the 
main players in the Uruguay Round. Section 4 identifies the scope for compromise in the 
US-EC agricultural trade confrontation. The final section contains the conclusions. 
2.  THE  ECONOMIC AND  POLmCAL RATIONALE  OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN 
AGRICULTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GATT GAME 
In the early  1980s,  an increasing awareness and documentation of distortions in 
world markets emerged. Efforts to explain the patterns of these distortions are generally 
drawn from the literature on political economy and public choice and from the modem 
theory of·public financel.  The collective action approach also provides a framework to 
characterise the nature of  the trade negotiations game. 
1 The observed patterns of  agricultural trade across countries cannot be explained on the basis of 
comparative  advantage  only.  Government  intervention  is a  significant explanatory variable  (see,  for 
example, Wolrath, 1988). -7-
a. Patterns of  agricultural policies and issues in agricultural trade regulation 
Many studies of agricultural  protectionism (e.g.,  Anderson and  Hayami,  1986  ; 
Parikh et al.,  1987; Krueger~  al.,  1988; Webb et al.,  1990; Lindert,  1991) have revealed 
a fairly consistent pattern of  protection across countries and time. The general conclusions 
are  :  i)  in  general,  rich  industrialised  countries provide  more  support for  agriculture 
relative to other sectors than do poor countries, ii) importers of  agricultural commodities 
tend to be more protectionist than exporters, iii) exporting developing countries often tax 
their agricultural sector, both directly by interventions within the sector and indirectly by 
protecting  their  urban  industrial  sectors,  and  iv)  the  level  of protection  is  positively 
correlated with the level of  per capita income. Hence, newly industrialised countries tend 
to shift from taxing to protecting their farm sector. 
This situation creates major tensions between exporters of primary products from 
the  developing  world  and  protectionist  industrial  countries,  and  among  the  latter 
themselves.  The food trade balance  sharply  deteriorated  in  many developing  countries 
from  the late  1960s  to the  mid-1980s  while,  at  the  same  time,  food  surpluses  have 
increased steadily in industrial countries. Agricultural policies are not the sole explanation 
for this outcome, but they have undoubtedly contributed to it as policies in the North have 
depressed  world  prices  and  policies  in  the  South  have  further  decreased  producer 
incentives. 
Many  studies  have  then  attempted  to  evaluate  the  implications  of  trade 
liberalisation in  the  industrial  countries  on the economies  of the developing  countries. 
Despite some discrepancies,  it  has generally been found  that liberalisation in  the North 
causes general price increases (including increases for wheat).  Food-importing countries 
might therefore suffer from agricultural policy reform in the industrial countries (Parikh et 
al.,  1987). Nevertheless, others stress that reforms of agricultural policies should benefit 
"-ev~loping countries. as  a  whole,  particularly if they  deregulate  their  own .  ~gricultural 
sectors too and if,  at the same time,  industrial countries liberalise non-agricultural trade 
(Anderson and Tyers,  1990; Burniaux et al.,  1990; Zietz and Valdes,  1990). At least the 
developing countries which export agricultural commodities competing with temperate-
zone  products  will  almost  surely  benefit  from  agricultural  trade  liberalisation  in  rich 
countries. -8-
The  picture in OECD  countries  follows  the  same  logic.  Most  net  exporters  of 
temperate-zone  products  like  Australia  and  New  Zealand  should  benefit  from  easier 
import access  and better terms of trade,  in contrast, net importers like Japan and most 
European countries would benefit from domestic reallocation of resources, but lose from 
adverse terms of  trade effects.  The potential economic gains have, in general, been unable 
to  trigger  political  action  toward  reform  in  the  latter  group  of countries.  Short-run 
political  costs  seem  to  have  received  more  attention  than  long-run  economic  benefits 
although recently some countries have unilaterally undertaken large-scale reforms of  their 
farm policies : New Zealand, Sweden and the EC are cases in point. 
b. Political economy of  agricultural policies 
Central to the  public  choice-political  economy  approach are the political  forces 
created by the behaviour of  individual fanners and their coalitions.  These groups include 
the numerous producer associations that seek to obtain from the state, through economic 
policy,  that  which  they  cannot  obtain  from  the  market  alone.  They  are  effective  in 
industrial countries because their number in proportion to the country's population is small 
and because a large share of their income is due to specialisation in a small  number of 
enterprises  (Olson,  1965).  These two  factors  tend to lower individual  farmer  costs of 
lobbying to seek legislation in their favour.  Benefits of agricultural  policies  tend  to be 
concentrated on farmer groups while costs are dispersed to the larger population. Hence, 
the relative oppositions to farmer  political forces tend to be weak because the costs to 
individual consumers or taxpayers of  forming a lobbying body to countervail these forces 
are high in comparison to individual returns. 
Four economic features tend to facilitate agricultural interests in gathering political 
support. 
i)  The  first  is  price  instability.  Price  instability  generates  an  asymmetry  in the 
development  of regulation  in  agriculture.  When  financial  stress  occurs  as  a  result  of 
adverse  price  conditions,  policies  are  often  introduced  to  alleviate  income  losses. 
However, these policies are seldom withdrawn when economic conditions improve.  Part 
of the reason for this is that agriculture is characterised by sector-specific resources,  in 
addition to land, that cannot be easily reallocated to other sectors. Consequently, the value 
of protection becomes embodied in these sector-specific factors,  e.g.,  land values,  used -9-
machinery  prices  and  so  on.  When  conditions are better,  the rise  in the  value  of these 
resources  is  associated  with  both improved  economic  conditions  and  economic  policy. 
Hence,  withdrawal  of the  previously given  economic  support  will  tend  to dampen  the 
recovery,  or,  if withdrawn after a recovery,  it will tend to induce another albeit modest 
decline. Producers are aware of  this potential decline in value of  their sector-specific assets 
and  therefore  have  an incentive to engage  in  political  actions  to  avert  this  eventuality. 
Hence, stabilisation tends to degenerate over time into permanent support. 
ii) A second related economic force that makes reform difficult is that agriculture is 
characterised  by  increasing  capital-deepening  over  time.  Investments  in  land 
improvements,  buildings,  irrigation,  or livestock  have  increased  productivity  but  also 
created financial liabilities. Furthermore, these investments are too difficult to reallocate to 
other sectors of  the economy. Such capital-deepening has, for example, clearly occurred in 
US  and EC  agriculture in anticipation of continued  support policies,  i.e.,  in  an  artificial 
policy-induced economy that cannot be sustained in the presence of free and open world 
markets.  Consequently,  at  the  margin  and  in  the  absence  of compensatory  payments, 
agricultural  policy reform will  almost  surely lead to a decrease  in  returns to resources. 
Since,  as  mentioned,  the  value  of economic  policy  affects  the  value  of sector-specific 
assets, agricultural policy reform implies a real decline in the returns to these investments 
and a sharp decline in the rate of  investment.  This decline in wealth is, for example, well 
known to US producers following the decrease in land values during the 1980s. 
iii) Land is also related to space, to environmental amenities, to rural development 
and to natural resources.  The increasing concern about the rural environment has drawn 
attention to the need to discipline agricultural practices harmful to natural resources.  This 
has also created new support for the country life in general, a support which policy makers 
have difficulty in providing through policy instruments that are decoupled from production 
incentives. 
iv) Finally, food, being closely associated with health and basic needs, has therefore 
clear emotional connotations.  In Europe and Japan this concern was  originally related to 
food  security  that  further  motivated  the  development  of agricultural  policies  after  the 
second world war.  More recently, the food  safety argument has served as a justification 
for non-tariff barriers and other forms of  regulation. 
A dynamic element to the political economy of  policies was stressed by Honma and 
Hayami  (  1986).  When the  farm  sector loses  comparative  advantage  during  a country's -10-
process of  industrialisation, obtaining political support is often facilitated.  This increase in 
support was observed in Japan in the 1950s, and is now taking place in the new industrial 
countries of  South-East Asia. 
Together, both economic and institutional forces make reform particularly difficult. 
The institutional reasons lie in the rigidity inherent in public choices such as the various 
channels  of congressional  committees,  legal  statutes  and  the  numerous  agencies  that 
provide,  bring  into  play  and  support  the  mechanisms  of policy  implementation,  co-
ordination  and  communication in the agricultural  policy  process.  Policy reform  in itself 
would then entail a substantive dismantling of this structure,  not unlike the dismantling 
that has been associated with the structural adjustment and stabilisation policies prescribed 
to  many  developing  countries  by  international  institutions.  Hence,  there  has  been 
insufficient incentive to deregulate farm policies unilaterally,  and instead  an incentive to 
"free-ride" by encouraging other countries to reform. -11-
c.  The pressure for agricultural reform : a public finance explanation 
Besides the political economy approach, there have also been attempts to explain 
agricultural policies on the basis of  modem public finance theory (Sah and Stiglitz,  1985 ; 
Newbury,  1987  ; Munk,  1989).  The  public  finance  analysis  supplements the  political 
economy approach by explaining the behaviour of  governments in choosing policies which 
achieve  distributional  objectives in  the most  cost-efficient way.  Modem public  finance 
theory  (Atkinson  and  Stiglitz,  1980)  emphasises  that  government  intervention  is 
associated  with  "information"  costs  (i.e.,  costs  of collecting  information,  enforcement 
costs and other administrative costs). Thus, lump-sum taxes are not a feasible instrument 
.  because they  are,  in  general,  associated  with  prohibitive  information  costs.  For this 
reason,  government  revenue has to be  raised  by taxes which  are associated  with both 
distortion and administrative costs. Since real distribution objectives cannot be achieved at 
no  cost, this explains why governments use policy instruments, which create distortions, 
both in  order to achieve  redistribution  objectives  and  in  order to raise  their  revenue. 
Governments  may  redistribute  income  to  producers  by  either  price  support  or direct 
income payments. Which instrument is most efficient depends both on the administrative 
and the distortion costs involved. Price' support is associated with relatively high distortion 
costs but relatively low administrative costs, and vice versa for direct income support. 
Price policies compare relatively favourably with direct income support policies if 
i) the administrative infrastructure is weak and the implementation and enforcement costs 
of  alternative transfer instruments are high, ii) the price support is given to a product for 
which the country is  a net importer,  so  that  price  support  is  associated with  positive 
government revenue (i.e., tariff revenue),  and iii) the supply elasticity is low,  so that the 
costs in terms of  distortion and production are small. 
The underlying factors which  provide the rationale for government use of price 
support policies change over time.  The importance attached to agricultural income seems 
to  increase  with  the  level  of economic  development  for  political  economy  reasons 
mentioned above and because the relative income position of farmers deteriorates.  Also, 
the administrative costs of  direct transfer instruments are likely to decrease with economic 
development,  whereas  the  distortion  costs of price  support  that come  with  economic 
development are likely to increase. 
Both the political economy and the public finance explanations are consistent with 
the observation that developing countries with weak administrative infrastructure and high - 12-
opportunity costs of government  revenue tend to protect import-competing agricultural 
and  industrial  products,  but  impose  negative  protection for  exportable  commodities  in 
order to raise tax revenue. The public finance theory also explains the introduction of  price 
support  policies  during  the  transition  from  developing  to  developed  country.  The 
administrative structures during this period are still weak. The agricultural sector becomes 
a declining  industry,  agricultural income  falls  behind  the  national  average  and  pressure 
builds up  among farmers to lobby for support which the government can easily provide 
through price instruments.  Finally the public finance approach, suggests that a move from 
market  price support to direct  income  support  may take place  in the course or' further 
economic development as the relative costs of  income instruments fall relative to those of 
price instruments. 
d.  Collective action at the international level : the Uruguay Round as a game 
The public finance  approach has suggested that economic conditions in industrial 
countries are now favourable to the adoption by governments of new policy instruments 
to support agriculture.  On the other hand, the political economy approach concludes that 
farmers have been able to keep the domestic political balance in their favour, thus halting 
the  internal  reform  process.  The  result  is  that  no single  country  is  likely  to pursue  an 
unilateral  refonn  even  though  doing  so  would produce  significant economic  benefits. 
Trade  negotiations between  industrial  countries  are  therefore particularly difficult  since 
governments must negotiate with these special interests in mind.  Collective action at the 
international level helps to understand why and how these contradictory forces, channelled 
into  the  agricultural  trade  game  of the  Uruguay  Round,  contribute  to  delineating  the 
contours of  the likely final agreement. 
Insights into international trade relations can be obtained when governments of  the 
various countries are viewed as rational decision-makers in a non-cooperative economic 
game.  Without  co-ordination,  the  players  pursue  agricultural  policies  taking  into 
consideration the interests of their respective  agricultural producers,  consumers and  tax 
payers, disregarding the effects their actions have on other players. This generally leads to 
a sub-optimal outcome. International co-ordination of agricultural trade policies holds out 
the promise of improving  the  situation.  Many  economic  studies  suggest that  aggregate 
welfare in most countries would improve from liberalisation in agriculture trade.  On this 
basis,  one would therefore expect the Uruguay Round,  which  provides a forum for co--13-
ordination  of agricultural  policies,  to  lead  to  substantial  freer  trade  in  agricultural 
products. Such expectations are, however, clearly based on wrong assumptions. 
A GATT agreement in agriculture will only come about if  the outcome created by 
such an agreement by the main players is considered an improvement in comparison with 
maintaining status quo. There is ample evidence that government preferences are such that 
major  unilateral  trade  liberalisation  is  a  preferred  option  in  only  very  few  countries. 
Moreover, freer trade world-wide is a public good since freer trade also benefits countries 
other than those who liberalise.  This situation suggests that the optimal provision of  this 
public good is unlikely to occur in a decentralised international system.  The international 
trade game is akin to a prisoner's dilemma situation. 
The prospects for agricultural trade liberalisation would be gloomy if the political 
balance in all countries was in favour of  agricultural protection to the same extent. This is 
not  the  case,  however,  as  some  developed and developing  countries  export  certain 
temperate-zone commodities on to world markets on a nearly competitive basis.  These 
countries have trade interests in the liberalisation of  the  trade in these commodities.  As 
governments pursue mercantilist objectives as well as seeking to placate special interests, 
an incentive for collective action at the international level therefore exists,  which will 
reinforce  the  trend,  suggested  by  the  public finance  approach,  towards  less  trade 
distortionary support instruments. 
This  incentive  may  not  be  sufficient,  however,  to  trigger  action  since  the 
negotiation process,  is based on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle  that the 
benefit of a concession made by  any  country must be  extended to all  other contracting 
parties.  In a multilateral framework, trade concessions also become public goods  When a 
large  number  of countries  is  involved,  the  incentive  for  any  one  of them  to  make 
concessions is reduced by the prospect of  having to share with all countries the benefit of 
the reciprocal  concessions granted in  return.  This  is  another free-rider  problem in the 
agricultural trade game,  more likely to result in  status quo than in a trade liberalisation 
when the negotiations deal with a large number of  small countries. 
The proliferation of  Free Trade Areas (FT  A), bilateral trade agreements and trade 
blocs may be seen as attempts to circumvent this externality problem created by the MFN 
principle.  The existence of  big  players in the international trade game helps to safeguard 
the principle of  multilateral trade agreements on which the GATT is based  This may 
appear as a paradox at first glance, but it is consistent with Olson's remark that collective - 14-
action is  more likely to occur in  heterogeneous groups with  some  players  having  high 
stakes in a successful organisation of the group to develop power. Group organisation is 
more likely to happen when some big players can take the role of catalysts in  collective 
action, because sufficiently large gains give them an incentive to move and because their 
relative size allows them to express credible threats to force other reluctant  players to 
move as well. If  all parties in the trade negotiations were of  equal size and unable to affect 
the terms of  trade of  anyone, no single country would have the incentive to initiate a costly 
negotiating process. It seems that US and other large agricultural exporters have such a 
incentive in the Uruguay Round. It is doubtful that agriculture would have played such a 
big role in the Round without these national interests in agricultural trade liberalisation. 
Moreover, the use of  the multilateral framework of  the GATT rather than purely bilateral 
deals will force smaller importing countries (subject to "credible threats") to comply with 
the agreement settled by the big players,  t~~~  ~~her  reinforcing the gains accruing to the 
big players from higher world prices. 
To summarise,  although the economic costs of agricultural policies in  industrial 
countries can now be reduced by introducing new instruments, all  countries involved in 
the Uruguay Round  have to find  a delicate balance between the domestic pressures to 
keep some support for their most protected farm industries and the objectives of  capturing 
the benefits of freer trade in the commodities they export on a more competitive basis. 
This makes it difficult for most countries to take positions for all  their farm  activities, 
consistent with broad principles. It also explains the ambiguity of  the negotiating strategies 
of many  countries and the limited  prospects to reach an agreement  close to the initial 
ambitions of  the Punta del Este declaration. 
3-AGRICULTURE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND: BETWEEN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TRADE CONFLICTS 
The current Round of  GATT negotiations was launched in 1986 in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay,  with  the  explicit  intention  that  the  negotiations  should  aim  at  a  greater 
liberalisation of agricultural trade.  The Ministerial Declaration stated that all agricultural 
policies, including domestic measures, import barriers and export subsidies, were subject 
to discussion. 
a  The Punta Del Este Ministerial Declaration : an ambitious programme -15-
In  the  seven  previous  Rounds,  the  notion  that  "agriculture  is  different"  was 
generally  accepted.  Therefore,  agriculture  was  never  really  brought  under  the  general 
GATT rules, it was granted exceptions from the general principles of  the Agreement and 
some  countries  were  allowed  specific  derogations.  Several  of these  exceptions  and 
derogations were incorporated in the GATT  at the insistence of the US.  Import quotas 
(Article  XI)  and  export  subsidies  (Article  XVI)  were  tolerated,  under  some  general 
conditions,  for  agricultural  products.  In  1955,  the US  obtained  a waiver of its  GATT 
obligations under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Variable levies 
were tolerated in the EC. 
Agriculture was largely left out, not of  the successive GATT negotiations2, but of 
the  GATT  commitments,  because  of the  pre-eminence  of domestic  issues  over  trade 
objectives in agricultural policies of  most contracting parties. A particular opportunity was 
missed in the Kennedy Round when the EC proposed to introduce a ceiling for its self-
sufficiency  ratio  for  important  products  and  to  bind  the  "montant  de  soutien",  which 
would  have  constrained  the  level  of price  support  and  hence,  of border  protection. 
However, the US rejected the offer that it might have been wise to accept3. 
Real  commitments  were  nevertheless  made  in  the  successive  Rounds  of 
negotiations.  Some  of them  seemed  rather  limited  at  the  time  but  have  since  become 
serious issues in agricultural trade relations.  The zero binding tariff on oilseeds and non-
grain feeds in the Dillon Round, and on grain substitutes (com gluten feed) in the Kennedy 
Round,  has both constrained the development of the CAP and given a leverage to other 
countries in the current negotiations. 
The announced objective of the Uruguay Round,  as  stated in the Punta del Este 
Declaration, was no less than to achieve greater liberalisation of agricultural trade by,  1) 
improving  market  access (i.e.,  reducing  import barriers),  2) "improving the competitive 
environment  by  increasing  discipline  on the use  of all  direct  and  indirect  subsidies  and 
other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade, including the reduction of 
their negative effects and dealing with their causes" (FOCUS, October 1986, p. 4), and 3) 
2 Until the Uruguay Round, domestic agricultural policies were regarded as non-negotiable (Hine 
et al., 1989). 
3 As pointed out by Warley (1989, p. 308) and Josling et al. (1990, p. 295). - 16-
reducing adverse trade effects of  sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. 
Although all countries agreed to bring agriculture further under the general GATT 
rules,  itwas clear from the start that the degrees of enthusiasm varied.  It remains to be 
seen how far this Round of  negotiations can go in achieving a programme with ambitions 
which quickly turned out to create problems for nearly all countries in some sectors and in 
nearly all sectors for some countries. 
b. Initial offers of  contracting parties and main compromises4 
The first  proposal tabled by the US  argued for the complete elimination of farm 
programmes by the year  2000  (the  "zero"  option).  The  Cairns  Group  agreed  with  the 
long-term  objectives  of the  US,  but  allowed  for  more  flexibility.  The  EC's  (and  also 
Japan's)  response  was  a  flat  rejection  of the  call  for  complete  elimination  of farm 
programmes. The EC proposed a negotiation process in two stages : short-term actions to 
stabilise the most seriously imbalanced markets (cereals, sugar, and dairy products) and, in 
a  second  stage,  reduction  of support  levels  based  on  the  decrease  of an  Aggregate 
Measure of  Support (AMS). 
The  wide  gap  between these  early  positions  led  to the  failure  of the  mid-term 
review meeting in December  1988 in Montreal.  Nevertheless,  at the  April  1989 session, 
the contracting parties agreed to propose commitments before the end of 1990 on short-
term measures and long-run reforms,  and  set  a time  schedule for  their implementation. 
This  agreement  was  possible  essentially because the US  adopted  (temporarily)  a more 
flexible position by abandoning the idea of  a complete elimination of  export subsidies and 
by  accepting  a discussion  on  short-run measures without  a precise  accord  on  long-run 
objectives. 
In October 1989, the US issued its revised proposal for a long-run reform which 
dealt with four topics  : import access,  export competition, internal support, and sanitary 
and  phytosanitary regulations.  This  proposal  was  particularly demanding  for  the  EC  as 
4For an excellent overview of  initial positions of the various contracting parties, see Hine ~  m. 
(1990). 3) 
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export subsidies were supposed to be eliminated over five years,  while  internal  support 
and  border protection could be  phased  out over ten years.  The  US  proposal tabled  in 
October  1990 was  somewhat  less radical  calling  .. only"  for a 90% reduction  in  export 
subsidies and a 7  5% both over I 0 years, of  internal support measures.  The US confirmed 
its will to negotiate simultaneously and explicitly in the three areas : market access, export 
competition and internal support. 
In its proposal of  November 1990, the Community repeated that AMS reductions 
would result automatically in decreases in the need for export subsidies and, hence, that it 
was  not  necessary to make  specific  commitments  in the area of export  subsidies.  The 
Community offered to reduce the AMS  by 30% between  1986 and  1995  and agreed to 
some form of  conversion of  its border measures into tariffs. However, this concession was 
contingent on the acceptance by other contracting parties of  the principle of  "rebalancing", 
i.e., the fixation of  tariffs on EC imports of  oilseeds and non-grain feeds5.  In other words, 
the EC agreed to make binding commitments on AMS reduction and tariffication, but did 
not want to negotiate specific CAP instruments. 
The meeting in Brussels in December 1990 failed to conclude the talks despite the 
ultimate tentative of the Swedish Minister of Agriculture, Matt Hellstrom.  The Swedish 
compromise followed the negotiation logic of  the US and the Cairns Group by proposing 
specific  commitments  in  the  areas  of internal  support,  export  competition  and  import 
access. None of  the parties was able to accept the Swedish compromise in its entirety.  For 
the US  and  the Cairns Group  countries,  the  reductions  of internal  support  and  export 
subsidies  were  deemed  insufficient  the  EC,  Korea  and  Japan  rejected  it  as  a basis  for 
negotiations,  the  EC  mainly  due  to  the  proposed  reductions  of export  subsidies. 
However,at the time of the Brussels conference the first proposals for the CAP reform, 
which  involve  a  switch  from  price  to income  support,  were  formulated,  and,  at  the 
beginning  of 1991,  the  EC  implicitly  agreed,  for  tl)e  first  time,  to  discuss  explicit 
reductions of  export subsidies. 
Most  of 1991  was  spent  on expert  discussions  which  were  helpful  in  clarifying 
issues and options, and at the end of  that year, the General Director of  the GATT, Arthur 
5 McCorriston  (1993)  provides an assessment  of this  proposal,  focusing  on  rebalancing  EC 
protection for grains. -18-
Dunkel, presented a new compromise.  Although it was not accepted in its entirety by the 
different parties, this compromise was at the core of the talks during  1992 and provided 
the basis  for  the successful  meeting  in  Washington  in  November  1992,  where  the  EC 
Commission and the US found a bilateral deal. 
The  Dunkel  compromise  (or  Draft  Final  Act)  dealt  with  export  competition, 
domestic  support,  market  access  and  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures.  It 
recommended,  over the period  1993-99, i)  a 36% cut in export subsidies in budgetary 
terms combined with a 24% reduction in the subsidised export volume,  ii) for domestic 
!1'Upport,  a 20% reduction in AMS,  and iii) with respect to market access,  tariffication of 
border  .measures,  a  36%  reduction  of these  and existing  tariffs,  and  a  guaranteed 
minimum  import  access  of 5%.  The  major  reform  of the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
proposed by the EC  Commission in July  1991  (CEC,  1991) and adopted  in May  1992 
(CEC,  1992) set the stage for this bilateral compromise. 
The basic features of  the Draft Final Act have been kept in the EC-US Washington 
agreement,  except  for  the  cuts  in  the  AMS  which  are  no  longer  effective  because  of 
sector-wide  aggregation  and  of a  temporary  exemption  of the  new  CAP  aids  from 
reductions. Furthermore, the latter agreement settles the oilseeds dispute, includes a peace 
clause and mentions, although in vague and not binding terms, the rebalancing issue which 
had been reduced in importance after the cut in grain prices decided in May 1992. 
c. Rationales behind the positions of  the contracting parties 
The  negotiating  positions  were  far  apart,  mainly  because  the  agricultural  sub-
sectors  of the  various  contracting  parties  are  characterised  by  different  degrees  of 
competitiveness. All countries pursue free-trade arrangements for their efficient exporting 
sectors and seek to delay adjustment in the others. 
In general, contracting parties of the Uruguay Round  may  b~ classified into two 
categories : the proponents of  reform and the proponents of restraint (Hathaway,  1990  ). 
The first group led by the US, the Cairns Group (including Canada, but to a lesser extent), 
and supported by other exporter developing countries, have tangible terms-of-trade gains 
to  expect  from  a  multilateral  approach  of trade  liberalisation.  The  second  group  is 
composed  of Japan,  the EC,  Nordic  countries,  importer developing  countries  and  also 
Canada for  animal products.  These countries do not  have obvious trade gains to expect - 19-
and their governments' position is highly influenced by the political clout of  farmers.  The 
EC  case is  even  more complex because  of the  expression  of national  interests  in  the 
Community  decision  process.  This  rationale  - trade  interests  for  some  countries  and 
domestic political costs for most countries - may be illustrated by some examples in the 
three main areas of  the negotiations. 
i) Market access 
A  major  issue  in  the  area  o(  market  access  has  been  tariffication,  i.e.,  the 
conversion of all  border instruments into bound tariffs.  It makes protection transparent 
and obvious.  It creates a direct link between world and domestic prices in protectionist 
countries. This procedure has been successfully used by the US in bilateral negotiations 
with Japan to obtain more open access to Japanese markets in beef and citrus (Blandford, 
1990).  Success with this  approach may  explain,  in  part, the US  propensity to use this 
strategy in the Uruguay Round. Obviously, tariffication would imply an important reform 
of the  EC  variable  levy  system6.  However,  it  would  also  affect  other  policies  and 
contracting parties such as the Voluntary Export Restraint Agreement on manioc imports 
into the EC, the waiver in the US (dairy, sugar, ... ),import quotas o~  dairy products, eggs 
and poultry in Canada, the rice import ban in Japan, ...  The negotiations on market access 
also  concern the amount  and  time  schedule  for  reduction in  tariffs  (including tariffied 
border instruments) and minimum-access provisions. 
In  1988,  Japan agreed to partially liberalise its restrictive beef import regime by 
phasing out beef import quotas over a three-year period. Beef quotas were replaced by a 
tariff that will equal 50% in  1992. Japan also agreed to remove import quotas on cheese, 
frozen yoghurt,  whipped cream and ice cream.  However, the major obstacle to a real 
reform of  Japanese agriculture is the high price support of  rice. Japan has repeatedly used 
a food-security argument to promote self-sufficiency in that sector. Hence, as regards rice, 
Japan  is  strongly  reluctant  to convert  quotas into  tariffs  and  to accept  the  clause  of 
mtrumum access. 
6 Hence, the modified version of tariffication proposed by the EC which would include i) tariffs 
with  a  fixed  element  and a  correction  factor  which  takes  into  account  exchange-rate  changes  and 
fluctuations in world prices, and ii) rebalancing. The Draft Final Act includes provisions related to item 
i), but item ii) has been left out. -20-
The  1990 Canadian proposal on market access was at variance from the Cairns 
Group position (75% reduction over 10 years of  tariff equivalents). Canada proposed that 
quantitative  import  restrictions  continue  to  be  permitted  under  Article  XI:2c,  and 
especially for products under supply control (i.e., dairy and poultry products in Canada). 
Even "fair" traders have difficulty confronting their own special interest groups. 
ii) Export competition 
The negotiations on export competition pursue the objective to make more precise 
and stringent the content of Article XVI of the General Agreement on export subsidies. 
The EC export restitution system is the main target of  the contracting parties with major 
trade interests. 
For a long time the EC has refused to discuss a specific commitment on export 
subsidies  on  the  grounds  that  this  would  automatically  result  from  the  decrease  in 
domestic support.  Under the old regime the EC would,  not accept any commitment to 
reduce  grain  exports  since  would  have  translated  into  significant  cuts  in  transfers  to 
farmers without significant trade gains. This is the background for the EC rejection of  the 
different GATT compromises up to 1990, including the so  .. called DeZeeuw paper which 
clearly  asserts  that  "the  commitments  to reduce  export  assistance shall  result  in  such 
assistance being reduced effectively more than other forms of  support and protection and 
that  these  commitments  may  take  the  form  of commitments  to  progressively  reduce 
aggregate budgetary outlays on export assistance,  per unit  export assistance,  the total 
quantity of a product in respect of which export assistance may  be provided,  or some 
combination of  such commitments" (MTN, 1990). The EC has been isolated on that issue. 
Although the US is currently carrying a substantial subsidy programme, its position 
on export competition reflects  the  expectations of a  major grain exporter from  better 
world prices. The Cairns Group position in this area is also based on the gains that these 
countries expect from freer trade on grains. Any commitment to reduce subsidised exports 
and export subsidies, by both the US and the EC, would imply reductions of  American and 
European exports  from  current  levels,  higher  world  prices  and  hence,  a  better  price 
competitiveness  for  the  Cairns  countries.  It  is  interesting  to  note,  for  example,  that 
Australia,  although  a  traditional  ally  of the  US  in  agricultural  trade  negotiations,  has 
accused both the EC and the US of  dumping their grain surpluses on world markets during -21-
the -six years of  the Round7. 
While  Japan  tends  to  support  the  EC  position  on  market  access  and  internal 
support,  it  accepts the US  and  Cairns  position on -export  competition.  Hence,  without 
unnecessary  risks  to  its  trade  interests,  Japan  supports  a ban  on all  export  subsidies. 
Nevertheless, given the net-importer position of  Japan on all agricultural products except 
rice,  this  "liberal"  line  is  not  too diffirult to follow.  A similar  reasoning  applies  to the 
Nordic countries. 
iii) Internal support 
All contracting parties accept the principle of a reduction in internal support, but 
disagree on how to implement this reduction (reference year or years, transition period, 
degree of reduction,  list  of measures  subject to reduction,  agreement  on  a measure  of 
support,  definition of the fixed  reference world price,  measure  of credit,  especially for 
products subject to supply management policies, ... ).  The various contracting parties have 
accepted to negotiate on the basis of  an Aggregate Measure of Support.  Hower, further 
developments in the Round have revealed that all countries, while agreeing on principles, 
have attempted to minimise the cuts in ·support. This is clearly illustrated by the Canadian 
proposal of  October 1990 and by the choice .in various proposals of  the base periods from 
which reductions are to be measured. 
Canada  has  not  been  able  to follow  thoroughly the  "hard"  line  of other Cairns 
countries calling for  "only" a 500/o reduction in internal support (on a 1988 base period) 
and insisting on the credit to be granted for supply control programmes.  This case shows 
again  that  even  "fair"  traders  have  some  sensitive  points  and  encounter  limits  in  the 
principles when they hurt the interest groups of  highly protected sectors. 
The choice of a 1986-88 base period in the US  proposals allows this country to 
minimise reductions in support (CARD,  1991). In the same way, the choice ofa 1986 base 
period  by  the  EC  also  reflects  its  desire  to  minimise  support  reduction  requirements 
because it maximises the credit for policy changes achieved in the EC from the beginning 
of  the Round (Westhoff,  1991 ). 
7 For example, US grain sales (with the help of  the Export Enhancement Programme or EEP) to 
China, Yemen and Kuwait have been the subjects of  complaints from Australia. -22-
Recent  developments  of the  negotiation  (i.e.,  the  Washington  compromise) 
exemplify the contrast between the accommodating treatment of  AMS reductions8 and the 
strict line kept in the areas of  import access and export competition. The latter agreement 
would relieve both the US and the EC from any domestic support cuts further than those 
implied by the US 1990 agricultural legislation and the 1992 CAP reform, but would in the 
long  run  imply  fairly  drastic  constraints  on  both  Community  preference  and  export 
volumes in the EC (Guyomard et al.,  1992). It reflects the necessity to buy international 
peace  with  a  fairly  generous  compensation  for  the  domestic  sectors  forced  into 
adjustment. 
4. Focus  ON THE US-EC AGRICULTURAL CONFLICT 
The previous sections made it clear that the possibility for the US and the EC to 
reach an agreement on agricultural issues will largely determine the outcome of  the GATT 
not only with respect to agriculture, but also with respect to other issues.  This justifies a 
more detailed look on the US-EC agricultural conflict. 
As  far  as  agriculture  was  concerned,  the  various  GATT  negottattons  were 
dominated by US-EC disputes. In fact, the major concerns of  the US have always been to 
alleviate or reverse the adverse consequences of  CAP principles on US trade in cereals and 
related feedstuffs. The US tolerated the EC trade policies on grains as long as the EC was 
not a significant exporter, kept from the temptation of imposing a tax on fats and feed 
imports and maintained import flows when further enlargements occurred such as in the 
Spanish agreement on maize. Now that the EC has became a large exporter of  grains and 
has  developed  a  significant  oilseeds  sector,  the difference  in  policies  between the two 
countries seems unacceptable. 
a. Empirical illustration by a quantitative assessment of  the US 1989 GATT  proposal 
8 This is a major concession from the US, particularly in view of the results of the oilseeds panel 
which  has  rejected  that compensatory  payments  could be  disregarded  in  a  GAIT context.  Bu~ this 
concession makes life easier for most countries which are supporting their farmers. -23-
The  results  of quantitative  assessments  of US  and  EC  proposals tabled  in  the 
GATT clearly illustrate the rationale of  the negotiating positions of  the two main players. 
The US focusses on trade policies, while the EC tries to square the circle by managing the 
conflict  between  the  alleviation  of the  external  pressure  and  the  costly  domestic 
adjustments. Let us take the example of  the US 1989 proposal. 
According to this proposal,  internal  support measures which  have a  significant 
impact on trade would be progressively eliminated over 10 years, import barriers would be 
tariffied and phased out, also over 10 years, and export subsidies would be eliminated over 
5 years. A simulation of  the proposal was perfonned over 5 years (from a 1988 data base) 
so  as  to  compare  the  relative  pace  of the  adjustments  in  both the  EC  and  the  US 
(Guyomard and Mahe,  1991).  The proposal was implemented in such a way that farm 
income  loss  in  the EC  would  be  minimised  when  export  subsidies  follow  the  5-year 
elimination  schedule.  Accordingly,  milk  production  quotas  were  used  to  ensure  the 
elimination of  exports of  dairy products after 5 years, so that price support can follow the 
less constraining 1  0-year phasing out schedule. Deficiency payments were not introduced 
for grains, however, so that the nominal rate of protection must be reduced by 72% over 
the 5 years of the simulation.  In the US,  the main  policy instruments concerned were 
deficiency payments (which follow  the  10-year schedule)  and the Export Enhancement 
Programme  (which  follows  the  5-year  schedule).  Finally,  the  analysis  assumed  that 
historical rates of  technological change in the two regions would continue into the future. 
Insert Table 1 
The results (Table  1)  suggest that,  after 5 years,  indirect price cuts in  the EC's 
agricultural  sector cause  it to attain  self-sufficiency  in  products  now  in  surplus,  with 
significant benefits to consumers and taxpayers (+21  and+  12 billion ECU, respectively). 
Total farm  income losses are nevertheless large (over 20 billion ECU).  In contrast, the 
US's agricultural sector suffers much less (farm income falls by 4.6 billion ECU "only") 
and,  of course,  the  cost  of the  US  programmes  decreases  sharply  (7  billion  ECU). 
Essentially, the US saves budget costs because the target price of grains is reduced and 
because world prices of  grains increase (  + 11%) as a result of  the elimination of  EC grain 
exports.  These world price effects would be sufficient for the US to increase its trade -24-
balance in grains while EC's trade deteriorates sharply. 
In view of  these results, it is not surprising that the EC rejected this US proposal as 
unbalanced But, more basically, the results reveal the unavoidable conflicts imbedded in 
the CAP, i.e., the conflicts between farm income, budget cost savings and export policy. 
They document the fact that a significant CAP reform is likely to be costly to tax-payers if 
farmers have to be compensated for income losses.  They also  reveal that a decrease in 
export subsidies would put a heavy burden of  adjustment on. the EC agricultural sector as 
long as price support policies were maintained, hence the EC's reluctance to strike a deal 
which would discriminate against export subsidies. Finally, they illustrate how US interests 
are served by such a deal because this country saves enough to compensate its farmers 
while it draws gains on its external balance. 
b.  Tlt,e Political economy of  the US-EC agricultural trade gtUIU! 
Several authors have analysed the political economy of  EC and US farm policies, 
either separately (Gardner,  1987) or in parallel (Petit,  1985  ; Meyer and  Josling,  1990). 
Furthermore,  Johnson ~  al.  ( 1990) have tried to evaluate the political weights (i.e., the 
political influence) implied by the observed behaviour of  US and EC policy makers.  These 
measures are then used to provide insights into the types of trade compromises between 
the US  and the EC  that are both politically feasible  and  resource saving.  Such weights 
were  estimated  assuming  that  the  policies  prevailing  in  the  EC  and  the  US  in  1986 
reflected a Nash equilibrium of an EC-US  agricultural trade game.  In other words,  the 
political forces discussed in Section 2 were balanced in such a way that neither country 
would  find an alternative policy action that would benefit its respective interest groups 
given the likely reaction of  the other country. The estimated weights of  major commodity 
groups, consumers and tax-payers are presented in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 
The results highlight both similarities and differences.  Similarities include the large 
weights of sugar and  dairy producers in the two countries,  and the small  power of the -25-
pork and poultry commodity group. Consumers have less political power in the EC than in 
the US in relation to tax payers (who are the reference group), so that budget indicators 
are likely to matter more in the US than in the EC. Beef and dairy producers also carry 
more weight in the EC than in the US, and the same is true for grain producers. 
What do these weights say about feasible compromises between the US  and the 
EC in the Uruguay Round ? 
A game  (i.e.,  alternative  trade policy  positions  ranked  from  the  status  quo  to 
progressively freer trade) was simulated on the basis of 1988 data, where the weights were 
used to calculate the outcome of  various degrees of  liberalisation on the political objective 
function of US and EC policy makers.  The policies included i) a continuation of present 
policy instruments but at different levels (game 1  ), ii) a compensation to the groups with 
the highest weights, i.e., with the highest political influence (game 2), and iii) a change in 
world markets (environment)  resulting  from  a liberalisation of policies in  other OECD 
countries (game 3).  Three possible strategies were then allowed,  namely  a)  status quo 
(sq), b) ban on producer and export subsidies  (ber)~ c) partial free trade (pft), and d) free 
trade (ft)9.  The  implications  to politically  acceptable trade compromises are  shown  in 
Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 
The results from the game 1 simulation suggest that, given the balance of political 
influence reported in Table 2 and the policy instruments in place in  1988, neither country 
could find a policy action that would benefit its interest groups better than the status quo, 
given the likely reaction of  the other country. In other words, these simulations illustrate 
the well-known  fact  that,  in  spite  of potential  economic  gains  from  deregulation,  the 
political influence of  commodity groups are able to stop the reform process. 
The question analysed in game 2 is : if compensation could be made to the most 
influential groups that lose from reform in each country, might the two countries agree on 
9 For precise definitions of  strategies, see Johnson~  al., 1990. -26-
some level of reform ? The results suggest an affirmative answer,  although they indicate 
that only partial liberalisation would result because budget  savings  from  reform  is  only 
sufficient  to compensate  more  powerful  losers.  Consequently,  freer  trade  is  likely  but 
completely free trade is not. 
The  implication  of this  empirical  analysis  is  not  too  surprising  in  light  of the 
discussion thus far.  Still, even these rather limiting possibilities for reform rest on a critical 
assumption that is  known as  dynamic  inconsistency (Persson and  Tabellini,  1990).  The 
essence of  the issue is that the optimum policy for government may be different before and 
after the private sector has responded. That is, for example, a government may promise to 
make decoupled payments if farmers agree to forgo the old policy instruments. But, once 
farmers  give up the old policy for decoupled payments,  a government may  not have an 
incentive  to  maintain  these  payments.  Anticipating  this  to  happen,  farmers  may  be 
reluctant to give up the old policy even if  the decoupled payments are lucrative. Now, the 
government,  anticipating  this  behaviour,  only  announces  time  ... consistent  policies,  i.e., 
policies  that,  while  socially  sub-optimal,  have  a  small  likelihood  for  reversal.  These 
policies are then credible in the eyes of farmers.  Finally,  as  mention~ the question of 
administrative  efficiency  and  information  costs  remains.  That  is,  can  administratively 
efficient policy instruments that decouple payments at low administrative costs be found ? 
Section 2 argued that this is increasingly the case in industrial countries. 
Finally,  the  simulation  of game  3  sought  to  provide  insights  into  whether 
liberalisation by the rest of the OECD would increase the willingness of the US  and the 
EC to reform.  The results suggest that reform in other OECD countries would induce the 
US to reform partially  even if  the EC did not reform. These results are consistent with the 
US  action  to  seek  bilateral  agreements  outside  of the  GATT,  such  as  the  free  trade 
agreement with Canada and currently NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). 
Effectively, the economic gains to the US from bilateral treaties tend to internalise gains at 
levels that exceed  .. political_costs  ..  Concessions made _under the ·GATT mean that economic 
gains  of reform  must  be  shared by  all  whereas bilateral agreements  internalise  a larger 
share  of these  economic  gains.  Whether  this  circumvention  of the  GATT  as  an 
international institution will strengthen or weaken it deserves considerably more study. 
In summary, the fact that only partialliberalisation looks feasible is consistent with 
the view that,  in spite of the initial zero  option tabled in the first  US  GATT  proposal, 
neither country is likely to be  able to carry out a complete elimination of its own farm 
programmes, particularly in the sugar and dairy sectors.  The US Congress has proved to -27-
be less enthusiastic than the Administration when it comes to the benefits expected from 
the GATT round. Hence, full-fledged deregulation of  the US agricultural sector seems out 
of reach.  The tactic of US negotiators in the Uruquay Round to set the targets at an 
unrealistic level, not only in the beginning but up to the final stage of  the negotiation, can 
be then interpreted either as a way to dramatise the need for reform in order to obtain a 
more preferred trade compromise, and/or as a strategy to accomplish through the GATT 
process domestic policy reform that could otherwise not be obtained through domestic 
political means alone. 
In the EC as well, where the CAP reform was viewed as unavoidable in nearly all 
circles in spite of wide discrepancies between Member States, a complete elimination of 
support programmes may not be envisaged. Hence, the mid-way nature of  the Mac Sharry 
project of July  1991  and of the CAP reform of May  1992  since  they  relieve  external 
pressure  without  uprooting  the  Market  Common  Organisations,  particularly  in  the 
sensitive dairy and sugar sectors which are protected from scrutiny by production quotas. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In sum, organised collective action within countries forces the negotiators to yield 
on  domestic  support  to  minimise  political  costs,  whereas  collective  action  on  the 
international scene has been led by the evident interest of  the more competitive exporters 
in maximising gains from freer trade.  The decreasing role of  the AMS in the negotiations 
appears as a necessity to sell a GATT agreement to the more powerful producer groups. 
This is obviously true for the EC, but also for most other countries, including the US, 
since all have some non-competitive sectors whereby cuts in income support are politically 
hard to achieve.  So,  the progressive tolerance by the US  to exclude  the  "new"  CAP 
compensatory payments from the AMS is consistent with its own difficulties in reforming 
the  sugar  and  dairy  sectors.  The  crucial  necessity  for·  the  .. EC  to  get · compensatory 
payments  exempted from  reduction  gives  leverage  to  the  US  for  obtaining  binding 
commitments with regard to tradeflows, and more particularly with respect to subsidised 
exports.  This is consistent with the political economy approach to the negotiation since 
countries with clear trade interests form an organised constituency which support a stricter 
discipline of  trade barriers and export subsidies along the antidumping philosophy of the 
GATT. -28-
The active role of  the US in this Round on agricultural issues can then probably be 
best understood by its relative size and by the potential of immediate and sizeable gains 
from trade liberalisation on grains that would exceed the adverse political losses in other 
subsectors.  It is clear that agriculture would not have played such a role without clear 
trade interests of the US  and the  Cairns  countries in  the cash crop sector and  related 
feedstuffs. The more defensive attitude of  the EC in the Uruguay Round may be explained 
by  the  relatively  stronger political  influence,  compared to the US,  of farmer groups  : 
hence, the stated EC position on short-run political costs and on adverse trade effects of 
multilateral reforms for some Member States. Nevertheless, technological advances have 
made the principles of the  "old"  CAP  increasingly inadequate,  even to attain domestic 
policy objectives.  The shift  to a permanent net  export position in most temperate-zone 
products,  with  the  budgetary  and  trade-conflict  consequences,  have  made  action 
necessary,  particularly  in  the  cash-crop  sector  where  interdependencies  with  other 
countries are the greatest. 
The strongly binding constraints which have survived the negotiations down to the 
Washington compromise are the export-subsidy cuts, while domestic-support reductions, 
and even market-access provisions have been much diluted. 
As far as agriculture is concerned, the Uruguay Round has increasingly given the 
irresistible impression of "deja vu".  After much debate on broad principles and ambitious 
plans, the setting has turned into a deal between the two big players that focuses on the 
solution to the immediate trade dispute: international competition in cash crops. 
It now seems likely that the Uruguay Round will be completed with an agreement 
which,  for  agriculture,  will  not  differ  much  from  the  Dunkel  and  Washington 
compromises.  The  commitments made may not,  in the  short term,  impose  any very 
binding constraints on the CAP,  which is in a process of change anyway due  to the 
emergence  of a  number  of other  constraints.  A  framework  has,  however,  been 
established in the form of  AMS, tariffication and restraints on subsidised export,  which 
may be used in future rounds to impose such constraints.  This may tum out to be the 
more  important achievement of the  prolonged agricultural trade  negotiation  in  the 
Uruguay Round than the actual commitments.  For the EC to become an exporter can-ied 
a price which EC  farmers eventually would have to pay.  The day of  reckoning may not 
have an-ived  yet, but it is not that far off -29-
Table 1. Impact of  the US October 1989 GATT proposal tin billion ECU). 
European Community  United States 
initial  final  change  initial  final  change 
(year 1)  (year 5)  (year 1)  (year 5) 
Net farm income  82.5  60.8  -21.7  67.0  62.3  -4.6 
Budget costs  16.1  3.9  -12.2  16.0  8.9  -7.1 
Consumer  - - +20.9  - - +1.6 
surplus 
Trade balance  -18.9  -31.9  -13.0  +8.5  +8.8  +0.3 
Source : Guyomard and Mahe, 1991. 
Table 2. Political-goal function weights and ranking of interest groups in the EC  and the 
US (based on 1986 data). 
United States  European Community 
Rank  Weight  Rank  Weight 
Sugar  1  1.56  1  1.57 
Dairy  2  1.29  2  1.46 
Animal feeds  3  1.23  3  1.32 
Grains  4  1.15  3  1.34 
Budget  5  1.00  6  1.00 
Beef  6  0.92  4  1.32 
Consumers  7  0.87  8  0.83 
Pork & Poultry  8  0.85  7  0.95 
Source : Johnson, Roe and Mahe, 1990. 
T  bl  3  P  "bl  b tw  th  EC  d  h  US  d  hr  a  e  OSSI  e agreement  e  een  e  an  t  e  un  ert  ee strategtes. 
US\EC  sq  ber  pft  ft 
sq  game 1 (current  - - -
instruments) 
ber  - game 2 (  decoupled  - -
payments)_ 
pft  game3 (OECD  - - -
liberalisation) 
ft  - - - -
Source : Johnson, Roe and Mahe, 1990. -30-
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